Fiscal Deficit, Capital Formation, and Crowding Out in India: Evidence from an Asymmetric VAR Model

by

Lekha S. Chakraborty

The Levy Economics Institute
and the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, India

October 2007

This paper is a part of the author’s doctoral thesis. The author is grateful to her Ph.D. supervisors, I. S. Gulati, Chandan Mukherjee, and Thomas Isaac, for their valuable guidance. Special thanks are due to Ashok Lahiri, D. K. Srivastava, K. L. Krishna, Sugato Dasgupta, Kavita Rao, and Pinaki Chakraborty for their helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF) Conference in Helsinki in August 2002. Author’s e-mail: lekhas@yahoo.co.in; lekhalekha@hotmail.com; lekha@nipfp.org.in.

The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals.

The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service. Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in the United States and abroad.

The Levy Economics Institute
P.O. Box 5000
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000
http://www.levy.org

Copyright © The Levy Economics Institute 2007 All rights reserved.
ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the real (direct) and financial crowding out in India between 1970–71 and 2002–03. Using an asymmetric vector autoregressive (VAR) model, the paper finds no real crowding out between public and private investment; rather, complementarity is observed between the two. The dynamics of financial crowding out is captured through the dual transmission mechanism via the real rate of interest—that is, whether private capital formation is interest-rate sensitive and, in turn, whether the rise in the real rate of interest is induced by a fiscal deficit. The study found empirical evidence for the former but not the latter, supporting the conclusion that there is no financial crowding out in India. The differential impacts of public infrastructure and noninfrastructure innovations on the private corporate sector are carried out separately to analyze the nonhomogeneity aspects of public investment. The results of the Impulse Response Function reinforced that no other macrovariables, including cost and quantity of credit and the output gap, have been as significant as public investment—in particular, public infrastructure investment—in determining private corporate investment in the medium and long terms, which has crucial policy implications.

Keywords: Fiscal Deficit, Crowding Out, Asymmetric Vector Autoregressive Model

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, in the context of macroeconomic management in India, it has often been argued that high fiscal deficit is affecting capital formation in the economy, both by reducing private investment through an increase in interest rate and also through reduction in public sector’s own investment arising out of ever increasing consumption expenditure.\(^1\) Also, the persistence of high fiscal deficits and ever increasing debt service payments are considered as one of the major constraints for the government at any level to undertake the necessary expenditures for productive capital formation. In other words, high fiscal deficit is affecting capital formation in the economy both by reducing private investment through an increase in interest rate and also through reduction in the public sector’s own investment arising out of ever-increasing consumption expenditure.

The taxonomy of crowding out—real and financial—has been treated in detail in theoretical literature (Blinder and Solow 1973; Buiter 1990). The real (direct) crowding out occurs when the increase in public investment displaces private capital formation broadly on a dollar-for-dollar basis, irrespective of the mode of financing the fiscal deficit. The financial crowding out is the phenomenon of partial loss of private capital formation, due to the increase in the interest rates emanating from the preemption of real and financial resources by the government through bond financing of fiscal deficit.\(^2\) Many authors have empirically tested the real (direct) crowding out and found contradictory results. Ramirez (1994), Greene and Villanueva (1990), Buiter (1977), Aschauer (1989), and Erenburg (1993) found that public investment and private investment have a complementary relationship; while Blejer and Khan (1984), Cebula (1978), Shafik (1992), Parker (1995), Ostrosky (1979), Tun Wai and Wong (1982), Sunderrajan and Takur (1980), Pradhan, et al. (1990), Krishnamurty (1985), Kulkarni and Balders (1998), and Alsenia, et al. (2002) did find evidence for crowding out between public and private investment (Appendix 1). The common analogy for the former set of studies is that increases in public capital formation stimulate aggregate demand and, in turn, increase private investment. Another link for the existence of this complementary relationship is that a higher stock of public capital (in particular, infrastructure) may increase the return of private investment projects. The latter set of studies on crowding out argued that public investment might act as a substitute for private investment. This substitutability can arise when the private sector utilizes public capital for its required purposes rather than to

---


\(^2\)
The general criticism about these studies on crowding out is that they fail to look into the aspects of the financial crowding out. Unlike in the case of real (direct) crowding out, empirical investigation of the financial crowding out is not straightforward and simple. The financial crowding out can be empirically established through a dual mechanism via rate of interest; firstly, whether private investment is interest rate sensitive and secondly, whether the rate of interest is induced by fiscal deficit. This two-fold analysis is significant because even if private investment is interest rate sensitive, this aspect by itself does not mean occurrence of financial crowding out if rate of interest is not deficit induced.  

Apart from this, many of these studies confined the analysis of real (direct) crowding out to the aggregate level of public investment, neglecting whether the infrastructure and noninfrastructure mix of public capital formation has differential impacts on private capital formation. Also, most of these studies suffer from acute methodological deficiencies, as they assumed the respective time-series to be stationary and proceeded the analysis by applying ordinary least squares. In other words, earlier studies have failed to address that time series may contain unit root and be nonstationary at levels (which can lead to spurious regression results) that would yield inconsistent estimates.

This paper examines real (direct) and financial crowding out in the context of India over the last four decades. This study is different from the existing studies on crowding out in India for four reasons. Firstly, the study bridged the lacuna of partial analysis status of financial crowding out in India by analyzing not only whether private investment is interest rate sensitive, but also whether the rise in interest rate is deficit-induced. Secondly, after correcting for unit roots and cointegration, the problems of simultaneity and ad hoc specification of lag structure are also eliminated in this paper by applying Hsiao’s asymmetric vector autoregressive framework. Thirdly, the aspects related to nonhomogeneity of public investment are captured through separate model specifications.

---

2 Buiter (1990) also discussed the taxonomy of real (direct) and financial crowding out in detail.
3 Alternately, higher private investment can result in lower public capital formation; for instance, firms might construct physical infrastructure (such as roads and bridges) themselves, thereby allowing the public sector to withhold from this investment. In other words, there exists a forward and backward linkage between private and public investment.
4 This is because the ad hoc configurations of demand and supply of loanable funds in the market is affected by myriad factors and these factors may have their respective role in the determination of rate of interest. But, from the perspective of the financial crowding out hypothesis, what is relevant is the extent to which the
incorporating public infrastructure investment and noninfrastructure investment. Fourthly, as the interest rate was administered till recently in India, whether the administered rate of interest reflects the market signals became the pertinent question that thwarted any attempt on financial crowding out in the context of India. This problem is tackled in this paper by decomposing the rate of interest series to understand the inflationary expectations intrinsic in it and tries to analyze whether the real rate of interest shows a varying trend along with the inflationary expectations in the intertemporal scale. The point to be noted here is that although the nominal rate of interest showed a nonvarying trend, particularly during the administered interest rate regime in India, it may not be so when it comes to the real rate of interest series. Real rate of interest showed substantial volatility intertemporally. This, in turn, validates that rate of interest (though administered) reflects market signals.

The paper has been divided into five sections. Apart from the introduction, Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework of the study. Section 3 interprets the data and Section 4 discusses the econometric results. Section 5 summarizes the major findings of the paper and draws conclusions.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CROWDING OUT

Though the neoclassical-flexible accelerator model has been the most widely accepted general theory of investment behavior, the application of these models in the context of developing countries posed certain challenges due to the key assumptions of the models, such as perfect capital markets and little or no government investment (Greene and Villanueva 1990). With the relatively significant role of government in the capital formation in developing countries, the standard models of investment could not be directly adapted to developing countries. Furthermore, even if standard models could be directly adapted to developing countries, severe data constraints arise when attempts are made to implement them empirically (Blejer and Khan 1984).\(^5\) Given these constraints, this paper attempts to develop a model for private investment in the context of India in line with the existing attempts to model private investment in the context of developing countries, primarily using neoclassical-flexible accelerator models.\(^6\)

\(^5\) However, certain studies [for instance, Sunderrajan and Takur (1980); Tun Wai and Wong (1982); Shafik (1992); and Blejer and Khan (1984)] have attempted to incorporate features of standard accelerator and neoclassical models of investment through relaxation of the basic assumptions underlying these models.

Theoretically, gross investment in the private sector is defined equal to net investment in the private sector plus depreciation of the previous capital stock, while net investment in the private sector is defined as the difference between the desired stock of capital in period \( t \) and the actual stock in the previous period \( t-1 \).

\[
I_{pvt} = \Delta KP_t + \delta KP_{t-1} \tag{1}
\]

where \( I_{pvt} = \) gross private investment
\( \Delta KP_t = N_{pvt} = \) net private investment
\( \delta = \) rate of depreciation

\[
N_{pvt} = \Delta KP_t = \beta(KP_t^* - KP_{t-1}) \tag{2}
\]

where \( KP_t^* = \) desired stock of capital in private sector
\( KP_{t-1} = \) actual stock of capital in private sector in the previous period.

\( \beta = \) coefficient of adjustment, \( 0 \leq \beta \leq 1 \)

Substituting equation (2) in (1), we get:

\[
I_{pvt} = \beta(KP_t^* - KP_{t-1}) + \delta KP_{t-1} \tag{3}
\]

In the standard lag-operator notation, equation (3) can be rewritten as:

\[
I_{pvt} = [1 - (1 - \delta)L]KP_t \tag{4}
\]

where \( L \) is the lag operator, \( LKP_t = KP_{t-1} \).

Now, we specify a partial adjustment function for gross investment as follows:

\[
\Delta I_{pvt(t)} = \beta(I_{pvt(t)}^* - I_{pvt(t-1)}) \tag{5}
\]

where \( I_{pvt(t)}^* \) is the desired level of private investment. In the steady state, desired private investment is given by:\(^7\)

\[
I_{pvt}^* = [1 - (1 - \delta)L]KP_t^* \tag{6}
\]

---

\(^7\) This equation requires that \( KP_{t+1} = KP_t^* \). This equality would generally hold in the steady state.
Combining equations (5) and (6), and solving for $I_{priv(t)}$ yields the equation as follows:

$$I_{priv(t)} = \beta [1 - (1 - \delta)L]K_P^* + (1 - \beta)I_{priv(t-1)}$$  

(7)

We know that in the accelerator models, desired stock of capital can be assumed to be proportional to the output expectations in the economy.

$$KP_t^* = \alpha Y_t^*$$  

(8)

where $Y_t^*$ is the expected output in the economy.8

Substituting equation (8) in equation (7), we get:

$$I_{priv(t)} = \beta \alpha [1 - (1 - \delta)L]Y_t^* + (1 - \beta)I_{priv(t-1)}$$  

(9)

The beta coefficient in the equation, which captures the response of private investment to the gap between desired and actual investment, is, in turn, assumed to vary systematically with the economic factors that influence the ability of private investors to achieve the desired level of investment. This paper hypothesizes that the response of private investment depends on the availability of financing (cost and quantity of credit, viz., $i_t$ and $C_{priv}$) and the level of public sector investment ($I_{pub}$).9

$$\beta = f \{C_{priv}, i_t, I_{pub}\}$$  

(10)

A linear regression model for private investment can thus be constructed assuming equations (9) and (10) are linear.

$$I_{priv} = a + b_1 I_{priv(-1)} + b_2 I_{pub} + b_3 i_t + b_4 C_{priv} + b_5 Y_t^* + \nu_t$$  

(11)

Before econometrically estimating equation (11), the next section interprets the data in the context of India related to these macrovariables.

---

8 The paper follows the assumption of Blejer and Khan (1984) that private sector investment depends on output expectations of the economy, not in the private sector alone. Blejer and Khan (1984) also noted that private sector output is proportional to total output.

9 Blejer and Khan (1984) hypothesized that the beta coefficient depends on: (i) the stage of economic cycle; (ii) the availability of financing; and (iii) the level of public sector investment. While Tun Wai and Wong
3. INTERPRETING DATA

Data on capital formation in public and private sectors is drawn from the new series of National Account Statistics published by Central Statistical Organisation. Data on other macrovariables of study (rate of interest, rate of inflation, the availability of credit to private sector, gross domestic product, gross fiscal deficit, exchange rate, and money supply) are drawn from various issues of the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, published by Reserve Bank of India. The period of analysis is between 1970–71 to 2002–03.

In the context of India, for the estimation of capital formation, the economy is divided into three broad institutional sectors—public sector, private corporate sector, and household sector. The household sector is conceived as the “residual” sector, embracing all economic entities other than the units of public and private corporate sector, essentially as clubbing together the leftover or the unknown of all units.10 In the light of these data problems, it should be noted that the household investment data is not entirely reliable and kept outside the purview of private investment in this paper. The gross capital formation noted a declining trend in the public sector, especially in the late 1990s, while private corporate sector investment has shown an increase (Figure 1).

(1982) hypothesized that the beta coefficient depends positively on the change in bank credit to the private sector and net capital inflow to the private sector.

10 The sources of data used in the estimation of household share are varied and divergent and, as a result, the estimates contain indeterminate sources of errors. In other words, the measured trend in decrease/increase in household investment rates can be a statistical artifact, likely due to the overestimation/underestimation of private corporate investment (Little and Joshi 1994).
The public sector played a significant role in the investment process in the 1970s, which is around the peak of approximately 10 percent of GDP; and then in the mid-1980s it grew further to around 12 percent of GDP before it declined to 6 percent of GDP in late 1990s. The private corporate sector, which was only 2.44 percent of GDP in 1970–71, had gained momentum in the 1980s and reached around 6 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s when the public investment was as high as 12 percent of GDP. The private corporate investment crossed over the public investment in terms of GDP in the early 1990s and reached a peak of 9.57 percent of GDP in 1995–96, despite a marginal declining trend thereafter. The trends related to the dominance of the public sector were partially reversed after the burgeoning fiscal crisis of 1990s, which led to a retrenchment in public investment with a simultaneous expansion of private capital accumulation, emanating from the booming private corporate investment in a decade of industrial delicensing and trade liberalization.

3.1 Nonhomogeneity of Public Investment
The public capital formation in India is nonhomogeneous in nature and can be broadly divided into infrastructure and noninfrastructure investment. Following Parker (1995), public infrastructure investment is defined as the aggregate of capital formation in agriculture, electricity, water supply, oil and transport, and communication. While the
public noninfrastructure is defined as capital formation in manufacturing, mining and quarrying, trade, hotels and restaurant, finance and insurance, etc.

**Figure 2: Trends in Infrastructure and Noninfrastructure Investment-GDP Ratio**

Based on this classification, it is noted that the gap between both series widened in mid-1980s; however, both series showed a declining trend during the 1990s (Figure 2). It is interesting to note that the decline in public capital formation is more in the case of noninfrastructure investment than infrastructure investment since 1980s.

In terms of crowding out, public investment—both infrastructure and noninfrastructure investment—is the most significant determinant of private capital formation. It is important to analyze whether different types of public investment are likely to have conflictive or mutually reinforcing effects on private capital formation; public investment in infrastructure, prima facie, tends to attract private investment, while public investment in noninfrastructural activities where public enterprises do what private firms can also do might have substitution effects. The comovements of public infrastructure and noninfrastructure investment with private corporate investment are given in Figure 3.
Public infrastructure investment, which was 3.2 percent of GDP in 1970–71, had increased to 5.44 percent in 1986–87 and thereafter had noted a steady decline to 2.76 percent of GDP in 2002–03. Private corporate investment on the other hand, though lower than public infrastructure investment in 1970–71 at 4.31 percent of GDP, had increased in due course to 6.84 percent of GDP in 1992–93. A prominent crossover of private corporate investment and public infrastructure investment was noted in 1991–92 when infrastructure investment in public sector was only 4.64 percent of GDP compared to private corporate investment at 6 percent of GDP. Noninfrastructure investment in the public sector also had a similar crossover in 1991–92. After the crossover, private corporate investment reached a peak of 9.34 percent of GDP in 1996–97 when public infrastructure and noninfrastructure investment were as low as 3.84 percent and 3.82 percent of GDP, respectively.

Apart from public investment, the other potential determinants of private corporate investment are output gap, rate of interest, and quantity of credit (equation 11). The stylized facts related to these determinants are discussed in the following subsections.

3.2 Private Investment and Output Expectations

Output expectations as a determinant of private investment emanates from the accelerator theories of investment. Consistent with the flexible accelerator models of investment behavior, a priori, we expect that private corporate investment is determined by the output expectations in the economy, which, in turn, is represented most closely by the level of output gap. The output gap index can be defined as
OG=\frac{\text{Actual GDP-Potential GDP}}{\text{Potential GDP}} \times 100 \quad (12)

This is also known as the “economic activity index” (Congdon 1998; Tanzi 1985). It can be seen from equation (12) that the “output gap,” or the index of economic activity, is defined as the difference between the actual and trend/potential level of national output as a percentage of trend/potential output.

Definitionally speaking, the potential level of output would be higher than the actual, as the resource utilization is maximized at the potential level. However, it is argued that cyclical factors, such as a recession or boom, could cause the actual to be below or above the potential output, respectively (Tanzi 1985). The major problem of estimation of the “output gap” lies on the estimation of potential level of output.11

Figure 4: Movement of Actual and Hodrick-Prescott Filtered Potential Output in India

11 Theoretically, the “production function method” estimates the trend/potential output by determining the quantity and productivity of inputs, viz., labor and capital. The relative importance of the two inputs are determined by assuming that their return is determined by their marginal products and their share in the national output is equal to their quantity multiplied by the return (Adams and Coe 1990; Congdon 1998). Trend output estimation through the “production function method” requires data on labor force and capital stock. If data on one or both of these series are not available, one has to search for other methods of estimation of trend output. One of the most commonly used methods of estimation of trend output is the “moving average method.” Another method, known as “trend through peaks” (hereafter, TTP), was developed by Klein with Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates. The steps involved in estimation are delineated below. The first step is to plot the data on GDP adjusted for price fluctuations and identify the peaks. Second, it is assumed that identified peaks in the series are the points where resources in the economy are used at 100 percent of their capacity. The third step is to intrapolate between the major peaks, including the first and last observation. The strong assumptions beneath the TTP method itself deterred us from using it as a tool for estimating potential output.
The Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter) is the method used in this paper for the derivation of the potential output. The idea of this filter is to decompose a nonstationary time series, such as actual output, into a stationary cyclical component and a smooth trend component (\( Y_t \) and \( Y_t^* \) denote the logarithms of actual and trend/potential output respectively) by minimizing the variance of the cyclical component subject to a penalty for the variation in the second difference of the trend component. This results in the following constrained least-square problem:

\[
\text{Min} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (Y_t - Y_t^*)^2 + \lambda \sum_{t=2}^{T-1} [(Y_{t+1}^* - Y_t^*) - (Y_t^* - Y_{t-1}^*)]^2
\]

(13)

The first term in the equation is a measure of fit. The second term is a measure of smoothness. The Langrange multiplier (\( \lambda \)) is associated with the smoothness constraint and must be set a priori. As a weighting factor, it determines how smooth the resulting output series is. The lower the \( \lambda \), the closer potential output follows actual output. Figure 4 traces the path of actual and potential output in India.

The comovements of private corporate investment and output gap are given in Figure 5. The plot revealed that the series have shown a significant crossover in the mid-1980s. After the crossover, private corporate investment increased to a peak of 9 percent of GDP in mid-1990s before it began to decline to around 4 percent of GDP in 2002–03.

**Figure 5: Comovements of Output Gap and Private Corporate Investment-GDP Ratio**

---

\( Y_t \) and \( Y_t^* \) denote the logarithms of actual and trend/potential output respectively.
It is difficult to decipher from the plots whether output gap and private corporate investment are positively or negatively related. The broad trend noted from the plot is that movements of private investment have been countercyclical to output gap with a distinct crossover in mid-1980s.

3.3 Private Corporate Investment and Price vs. Quantity of Credit

With regard to availability of financing, a hypothesis emerged in recent years that, in contrast to developed countries, one of the principal constraints on investment in developing countries is the quantity, rather than cost, of the financial resources. This view is associated with McKinnon (1973) in his controversial work, *Money and Capital in Economic Development*. McKinnon (1973) was the first to challenge the conventional wisdom intrinsic in the Keynesian and neoclassical models that investment is interest rate sensitive and a low interest rate would promote investment spending and economic growth in developed and developing countries (Molho 1986).\(^{12}\) It is noted that one of the principal constraints on investment in developing countries is the quantity, rather than the cost, of financial resources and it would be legitimate to hypothesize that a private investor in a developing country is restricted by the level of bank financing (Blejer and Khan 1984). The variable “availability of credit” is taken in the form of annual growth rate of outstanding credit from the banking sector to the commercial sector. This variable is included in our study to understand whether it is the credit that gets rationed in the investment decisions in India. It is to be noted that moral hazards and adverse selection problems can lead to credit rationing since the riskiness of investments cannot be identified a priori (Stigliz and Weiss 1981).

In order to analyze whether there is any impact of the cost of funds (i.e., the impact of rate of interest) on private corporate investment, the study encountered the problem of selecting appropriate interest rates among the plethora of available interest rates in the financial market. The real Prime Lending Rate was selected from the spectrum of rates of interest in India due to its relevance in determining the investment process in the economy. The next task is to transform the Prime Lending Rate into real rate of interest.

\(^{12}\) Shaw (1973) also challenged the conventional wisdom that low interest rates are adopted in the countries as a way of promoting economic growth. A detailed discussion of various rationale for a policy of low interest rates is given in Shaw (1973).
According to the Fisher hypothesis, the nominal rate of interest ($\gamma^n$) is given by

$$\gamma^n = \gamma^r + \pi^e \quad (ex \text{ ante equation})$$

$$\gamma^n = \gamma^r + \pi \quad (ex \text{ post equation})$$

where $\gamma^r$ is the ex ante real rate of interest; $\pi^e$ and $\pi$ are, respectively, the expected and real rate of inflation. The real rate of interest in any period is thus postulated to evolve as a deviation between the nominal rate of interest and the rate of inflation (WPI). The ex ante real rate of interest is derived by subtracting the expected rate of inflation from the nominal rate of interest. The ex ante real rate of interest and nominal rate of interest showed a sticky nonvarying nature over the time period, though the real rate of interest (which is the difference between nominal rate of interest and nominal rate of inflation) showed considerable variations in the intertemporal scale, which motivated the study to use the real rate of interest for the analysis.

The comovements of cost and quantity of credit with private corporate investment (as a percent of GDP) are given in Figure 6. The plots revealed the negative relationship between the real rate of interest and private corporate investment; especially in the mid-1990s, private investment declined monotonically while the real rate of interest remained high, around a range of 8–10 percent with mild fluctuations.

Figure 6: Comovements of Cost and Quantity of Credit with Private Corporate Investment-GDP Ratio

![Figure 6: Comovements of Cost and Quantity of Credit with Private Corporate Investment-GDP Ratio](image)
The rate of growth of bank credit (nonfood credit) to the commercial sector has shown violent fluctuations, especially since mid-1980s. A subtle positive correlation can be deciphered from the coplots of private corporate investment and the growth rate of credit, especially in the mid-1990s, which testified a falling private investment and lower growth rate of credit to the commercial sector.

3.4 Set of Stylized Facts

Before going for the econometric estimation of the model, this section attempts a quick recap of the stylized facts derived from the theoretical discussions above. The direct crowding out (or crowding in) can be captured from the substitution (or complementary) relationships between public and private spending that occur—not through changes in prices, interest rates, or required rate of return by changes in public sector activity, but through public sector consumption/investment being an argument in private utility functions and through the public sector capital stock being an argument in private sector production functions. A priori, we anticipate a positive or negative sign for the public investment variables.

Furthermore, cost and quantity of credit variables are included in the model specification to examine the validity of the McKinnon hypothesis in an Indian context, whether it is the quantity of credit that gets rationed and not the cost of credit that matters for private investment in developing countries. This hypothesis may be set against the backdrop of the recent trends of banks in investing above the SLR (Statutory Liquidity Ratio) requirements in India. A priori, the real rate of interest is expected to have a negative sign and availability of the credit to have a positive sign in determining private capital formation. The sign of macroeconomic activity proxied by output gap is expected, a priori, to be positive or negative depending on whether the investment decisions in India are procyclical or countercyclical.

\[
I_{pri} = f\{I_{pub}, i, C_{pri}, Y^*\}
\]

\[
(+/-), (-), (+), (+/-)
\]

13 While financial crowding out is defined as the consequences of public actions that affect private behavior, either by altering budget constraints or by influencing the prices faced by private agents, viz. rate of interest (Buiter 1990). In other words, financial crowding out is based on the notion that deficit spending not accompanied by new issuances of money carries with it the need for government to float debt issues that compete with the private debt instruments in financial markets (Blinder and Solow 1973). The resulting upward pressure on interest rates will reduce any private expenditure, which is interest rate sensitive.
4. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL

Prima facie, it is difficult to understand from the plots whether the macroseries under consideration are stationary or not. It is equally difficult to arrive at the conclusion whether these macroseries have stable long-run relationships with private corporate investment. In this section, these issues will be dealt with econometrically through the pretests of unit roots (with structural breaks) and cointegration before proceeding to the model estimation. This paper used Hsiao’s methodology for model estimation because it has the advantage of judicious parametrisation of lag structure using Akaike’s final prediction error when compared to Sims-Granger framework of causality. Also, this VAR-FPE approach does not infect the model with spurious restrictions on variables.

4.1 Checking for Stationarity of Series: Unit Root Tests with Structural Break

Testing of unit root involves the testing of order of integration of the data series. A series $X_t$ is said to be integrated of order $d$, denoted by

$$X_t \sim I_t (d) \quad (14)$$

If it becomes stationary after differentiating $d$ times, $X_t$ contains $d$ unit roots. Using the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) methodology, the fundamental regression equation to test unit roots is:

$$\Delta y_t = a_0 + a_1 t + a_2 y_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} b_i \Delta y_{t-i} + \epsilon_t \quad (15)$$

The null hypothesis of unit root is accepted if $a_2=0$. If the null hypothesis $a = a_2 = 0$ is rejected, the series is trend stationary. However, the unit root test in the presence of a structural break is different from simple ADF test. Based on ADF equation, Perron (1989) developed a method to test unit roots incorporating structural change. Perron’s procedure for unit roots based on modified ADF is as follows:

---

14 One of the major problems of the ADF test is the selection of appropriate lag length. Including too many lags reduces the power of the test to reject the null hypothesis since the increased number of lags requires the estimation of additional parameters and loss of degrees of freedom. On the other hand, too few lags would not capture the actual error process and would fail to give a proper estimate (Enders 1995). We followed the approach suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991) for the selection of appropriate lag length; that is, to start with a relatively long lag length and pare down to the model by the usual t-test and/or F-test. Thus, one can estimate the equation using a lag length of $n^*$. If the t-statistics are insignificant in the lag $n^*$, repeat the procedure until the last lag becomes significant.
\[ H_0: y_t = a_0 + y_{t-1} + \mu_1 D_p + \mu_2 D_L + \epsilon_t \]  \hspace{1cm} (16) 

where \( D_p = 1 \) for \( t=\tau +1 \) and 0 otherwise; and \( D_L = 1 \) for \( t > \tau \) and 0 otherwise. The structural break is assumed to have occurred at \( \tau \). The appropriate alternative hypothesis in this case is 

\[ A_0: y_t = a_0 + a_t + \mu_2 D_L + \mu_3 D_T^* + \epsilon_t \]  \hspace{1cm} (17) 

where \( D_T = t - \tau \) for \( t > \tau \) and 0 otherwise. In other words, the alternative hypothesis is that the series is stationary around the trend, and the slope and intercept of the trend line change at \( t= \tau +1 \).

Perron (1989) suggested a two-step procedure for testing unit roots in the presence of structural break.

**Step 1:** Detrend the data by estimating the alternative hypothesis and calling the residual \( y_t' \).

**Step 2:** Estimate the regression \( y_t' = a_2 y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \).

If the errors from this second regression equation do not appear to be white noise, estimate the equation in the form of augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The \( t \)-statistic for the null hypothesis can be compared to the McKinnon critical values.

We assume a break for the macrovariables in 1991. The significance of a break in the trend is ascertained in terms of a Chow test. The results of the Chow test in terms of F-Statistic and Log Likelihood statistic revealed that all macrovariables exhibited a break in the trend in 1991 (Table 1).

**Table 1: Testing Variables for Structural Break in 1991**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macrovariables</th>
<th>Break point</th>
<th>Estimated Chow Test F-Statistic</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Estimated Chow Test Log Likelihood Statistic</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Corporate Investment</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>10.39</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Investment</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>39.85</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>43.60</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real rate of interest</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>48.19</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>48.31</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>14.24</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>22.57</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Infrastructure Investment</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>0.0175</td>
<td>9.21</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Noninfrastructure Investment</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>0.0290</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>0.0178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonfood Credit</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>21.06</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>29.61</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next step is to test for unit roots incorporating the structural break in 1991. The results of unit root tests incorporating the structural break of private corporate investment and its a priori determinants based on Perron’s methodology are presented in the Table 2. There is no problem of seasonality as it is annual data.

**Table 2: Unit Root Test Results for Private Corporate Investment and its a priori Determinants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macrovariables</th>
<th>Structural Break at</th>
<th>ADF test statistics First-difference (without trend)</th>
<th>Order of integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Corporate Investment</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-8.028</td>
<td>I ~ (1) at 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Investment</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-8.190</td>
<td>I ~ (1) at 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real rate of interest</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-7.767</td>
<td>I ~ (1) at 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Gap</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-5.874</td>
<td>I ~ (1) at 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Infrastructure Investment</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-10.670</td>
<td>I ~ (1) at 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Noninfrastructure Investment</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-9.1798</td>
<td>I ~ (1) at 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-food Credit</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-8.967</td>
<td>I ~ (1) at 1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The Campbell and Perron (1991) method is used for selecting the appropriate lags. Critical levels for first difference without trend are –2.6423 (1% level). Source for critical values: MacKinnon (1991)

All the variables are found stationary in first differences without trend. Dickey Fuller statistics thus imply that all variables are integrated of order one, that is, I ~ (1).

**4.2 Testing for Cointegration: Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood Approach**

Having established that macrovariables are nonstationary and have same order of integration at I ~ (1), we test whether the linear combination of these macroseries is stationary, that is, they are cointegrated. Cointegration is a test for equilibrium between nonstationary variables integrated of the same order. In case of multivariate models, Johansen’s cointegration test is superior to Engle-Granger cointegration methodology for three reasons. First, the Johansen and Juselius method tests for all the number of cointegrating vectors between the variables based on the trace statistic test. Second, it treats all variables as endogenous, thus avoiding an arbitrary choice of dependent variable. Third, it provides a unified framework for estimating and testing cointegrating relations within the framework of a vector error correction model (VECM).15

Johansen-Juselius tried to develop a methodology, as follows, to study the long-run relationship among nonstationary variables. Let us define $z_t$ as “n” potentially endogeneous variables and model $z_t$ as an unrestricted VAR of k lags,

---

15 Gonzalo (1994) also pointed out that the Johansen maximum likelihood procedure for cointegration is a better technique compared to single equation methods and alternative multivariate methods.
\[ z_t = A_1 z_{t-1} + \ldots + A_k z_{t-k} + u_t \quad \text{where} \quad u_t \sim \text{IN} (0, \Sigma) \quad (18) \]

where \( z_t \) is \((n \times 1)\) and each of the \( A_i \) is an \((n \times n)\) matrix of parameters.\(^{16}\)

Equation (15) can be reformulated into a vector error correction (VECM) form:

\[ \Delta z_t = \Gamma_1 \Delta z_{t-1} + \ldots + \Pi z_{t-k} + \mu_t \quad (19) \]

where \( \Gamma_i = -(I - A_1 - \ldots - A_i) \), \( (I - A_1 - \ldots - A_k) \).

and \( \Pi i = -(I - A_1 - \ldots - A_k) \).

Equation (16) contains information on both the short-run and long-run adjustment to changes in \( z_t \), via the estimates of \( \hat{\Gamma}_i \) and \( \hat{\Pi} \), respectively. As shown in Johansen (1988), \( \Pi = \alpha \beta^\top \), where \( \alpha \) represents the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium, while \( \beta \) is a matrix of long-run coefficients, such that the term \( \beta^\top z_{t-k} \) represents up to \( n-1 \) cointegrating relationships in the multivariate model, which ensure that the \( z_t \) converge to their long-run, steady-state solution.\(^{17}\)

We have used a trace (\( \lambda_{\text{trace}} \)) test of the stochastic matrix to determine the number of cointegrating relationships, which is defined as follows:

\[ \hat{\lambda}_{\text{trace}} (r) = -T \sum_{i=r+1}^{n} \ln(1 - \hat{\lambda}_i) \]

\(^{16}\) This type of VAR-model is to estimate dynamic relationships among jointly endogenous variables without imposing strong a priori restrictions (such as particular structural relationships and/or exogeneity of some of the variables). The system is in reduced form with each variable in \( z_t \) regressed on only lagged values of both itself and all other variables in the system. Thus, OLS is an efficient way to estimate each equation comprising (i) since the right hand side of each equation in the system comprises a common set of (lagged and thus, predetermined) regressors (Harris 1995).

\(^{17}\) Assuming that \( z_t \) is a vector of nonstationary I(1) variables, then all the terms in (16) that involve \( \Delta z_i \) are I(0). We need to have \( u_t \) as I(0) for existence of a long-run relationship. This can happen only when \( \Pi z_{t-k} \) is stationary, which can be met in three instances: when all variables in \( z_t \) are in fact stationary. The second instance when there is no cointegration, that is, \( \Pi \) is a \((n \times n)\) matrix of zeros. The third way for \( \Pi z_{t-k} \) to be I(0) is when there exists up to \((n-1)\) cointegration relationship: \( \beta^\top z_{t-k} \sim I(0) \). In this instance, \( r \leq (n-1) \) cointegration vectors exist in \( \beta \) (that is, \( r \) columns of \( \beta \) form \( r \) linearly dependent combinations of variables, each of which is stationary), together with \((n-r)\) nonstationary vectors (that is, \( n-r \) columns of \( \beta \) form \( I \sim (1) \) common trends.). Only the cointegrating vectors enter equation (ii), otherwise \( \Pi z_{t-k} \) would not be I(0), which implies that \((n-r)\) columns of \( \alpha \) are effectively zero. The problem of estimating the number of cointegrating vector in a multivariate system boils down to estimating the rank of \( \Pi \) matrix.
where $\lambda_i$ = estimated values of the characteristic roots (also called eigen values) obtained from the estimated $\pi$ matrix; to the generalized eigen value problem

$$\left[ \lambda \mathbf{w} - S L S \mathbf{w}^{-1} S \zeta \right] = 0$$

where the matrices $S_{ij}$ are the residual moment matrices obtained from equation (19) and $T$ = the number of usable observations.

The empirical process of Johansen’s cointegration involves the following three steps. The first step involves the determination of the optimum lag of VAR. This involves the estimation of the first differenced variables of the VAR with alternative lag lengths. The AIC, SBC, and the likelihood ratio test collectively suggest an optimal lag length of one.

Table 3: Cointegration Tests Based on Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood Method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No: of CE</th>
<th>Trace Test Statistics</th>
<th>Critical Value (5 Percent)</th>
<th>Critical Value (1 Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>$I_{pvt} = \inf \left{ I_{pub}, I_{pvt}, C_{pvt}, Y^* \right}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>98.365</td>
<td>59.46</td>
<td>66.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>52.761</td>
<td>39.89</td>
<td>45.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26.455</td>
<td>24.31</td>
<td>29.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.423</td>
<td>12.53</td>
<td>16.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0523</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>6.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>$I_{pvt} = \inf \left{ I_{inf}, I_{rvt}, C_{pvt}, Y^* \right}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>77.949</td>
<td>59.46</td>
<td>66.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>48.231</td>
<td>39.89</td>
<td>45.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26.380</td>
<td>24.31</td>
<td>29.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.405</td>
<td>12.53</td>
<td>16.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.632</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>6.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>$I_{pvt} = \inf \left{ I_{noninf}, I_{rvt}, C_{pvt}, Y^* \right}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>88.539</td>
<td>59.46</td>
<td>66.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>51.632</td>
<td>39.89</td>
<td>45.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26.850</td>
<td>24.31</td>
<td>29.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.9454</td>
<td>12.53</td>
<td>16.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.050</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>6.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second step involves the selection of deterministic terms in VAR. The data reveal no quadratic trend, though there is linear trend. This implies an intercept in VAR, but no trend. The third step involves the estimation of the cointegrating equations using Johansen’s likelihood ratio trace ($\lambda_{\text{trace}}$) criterion. Using nondeterministic trends, the $\lambda$-trace test suggested that the rank (number of cointegrating vectors) is three for all the three models (Table 3).
4.3 Causality Detection

As the macrovariables are tested for the order of integration and cointegration, the next task that follows the logical order is to detect the direction of the causality between the variables. \(X_t\) is a Granger cause of \(Y_t\) (denoted as \(X_t \rightarrow Y_t\)) if \(Y_t\) can be predicted with accuracy by using past values of \(X_t\) rather than by not doing so, other information being identical (Granger 1969).

The appropriate parametrisation of the model manifests the critical part of Granger-causality test, as the results depend on the lag length chosen. Arbitrary or ad hoc parametrisation can lead to econometric problems. Underparametrisation may lead to estimation bias and overparametrisation results in the loss of degrees of freedom and thus, the power of the test.\(^{18}\)

Hsiao’s (1981) method is one of the alternatives to unconstrained Sims-type symmetric VAR.\(^{19}\) Hsiao’s procedure starts from univariate autoregression and sequentially adds lags and variables using Akaike’s (1969) Final Prediction Error criterion. This asymmetric VAR model, using FPE criterion to select the appropriate lag specification, takes care of parametrically prolific symmetric VAR models. An advantage of Hsiao (1981) asymmetric VAR is that, along with the appropriate parametrisation, we can detect the causality of the variables also in the autoregressive framework. Asymmetric VAR models permit more flexibility in modeling dynamic systems. In asymmetric VAR, each equation has the same explanatory variables, but each variable may have a different number of lags. Hsiao noted that “FPE criteria is appealing since it balances the risk due to the bias when a lower order is selected and the risk due to the increase of variance when a higher order is selected.” And by combining final prediction error criterion and Grangers’ (1969) definition of causality, a practical method for identification of the system of equations was suggested.

\(^{18}\) On the basis of parametrisation, vector autoregressive modeling can be of two types. The first type of VAR model is standard Sims-type VAR model in which every variable enters every equation with the same lag length. This is a symmetric VAR model since it employs symmetrical lag specifications. The second type is the asymmetric VAR model. The asymmetric VAR model is defined as a VAR where each variable may have a unique number of lags. The advantage of asymmetric VAR over symmetric VAR is that the latter employs the same lag length for each variable, exhausts considerable degrees of freedom, and, consequently, often estimates many statistically insignificant coefficients.

\(^{19}\) Litterman (1986) used Bayesian vector autoregressive model, which is another alternative to symmetric VAR. Hsiao’s (1981) asymmetric VAR has an advantage against Littermans’ Bayesian VAR. Litterman imposes Bayesian prior restrictions on VAR coefficients. Since these prior restrictions are almost always based on forecasting performance instead of economic theory, parameter estimates from Bayesian VARs are likely to be biased. Bias may be acceptable in forecasting, but biased structural parameters estimates are undesirable if the goal is to answer questions about macroeconomic structure and the channels of operation of a macrovariable (Keating 2000).
Vector autoregression models can be written in general form as

\[ y_t = \alpha + \psi(L)y_t + \mu_t \]  (20)

where \( y_t \) is vector of model variables

that is, (first difference of \((I_{pub})\), \((O_g)\) \((i)\), \((\Delta C_{pr})\), \((e_r)\)

\( \alpha \) is a vector of constants,

\( \mu_t \) is a vector of white noise error terms, and

\( \psi (L) \) is a vector of polynomials in the lag operator, \( L \)

where \( \psi_{ii} = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \psi_{ii} L^i \) where \( L \) is the lag operator and \( \mu_t \) and \( \nu_t \) are white noise error terms.

To choose the order of lags in \( \psi_{ii} (L) \) and \( \psi_{ij} (L) \) by the minimum FPE is equivalent to applying an approximate F-test with varying significance levels (Hsiao 1981). Akaike’s definition of Final Prediction Error criteria is expressed as

\[ FPE_{y}(m,n) = \frac{T + m + n + 1}{T - m - n - 1} \frac{\sigma^2 y(m,n)}{T} \]  (21)

where \( T \) = the number of observations,

\( m = \) order of lags of \( y \),

\( n = \) the order of lags \( x_s \),

and

\[ \sigma^2 y(m,n) = \sum_{i=1}^{T} (\hat{y}_t - \Psi_{ii}^n(L) \hat{y}_t - \Psi_{ij}^n(L) \hat{x_{(s)}^n} - \hat{a})^2 \]  (22)

where superscripts \( m \) and \( n \) denote the order of lags in \( \psi_{11} (L) \) and \( \psi_{12}(L) \).

\( L \), \( \psi_{n12} (L) \) \( x_n \), and \( \hat{a} \) are the least-square estimates. The causality can be detected as follows: If \( FPE \ y (m, n) < FPE \ y (m, 0) \) then \( x(s) \)\( \Rightarrow \) Granger causes \( y_t \), denoted by \( x(s) \Rightarrow y_t \).

The final prediction error (FPE) of fitting one dimensional autoregressive process for private corporate investment is computed with upper bound of lag length \((L^*)\), assumed to be equal to 5 in all the models discussed in the paper. Firstly, we considered private corporate investment as a controlled variable, holding the order of its autoregressive operator to one, based on FPE criteria; we sequentially added the lags of the manipulated variables, such as public investment, real rate of interest, output gap, availability of credit...
to private sector, and exchange rate up to the \( L^* \) of 5 and found the respective order that gives the smallest FPE.

Table 4: Public Investment–Private Investment Models: Results: Hsiao (1981)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controlled Variable</th>
<th>Manipulated Variables</th>
<th>Optimum lags of Manipulated Variable</th>
<th>Final Prediction Error</th>
<th>Causality Inference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model I</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I_{pvt}(1) )</td>
<td>( (i, \pi) )</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>0.0858</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I_{pvt}(1) )</td>
<td>( (i, \pi) )</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>1.0611</td>
<td>( (i, \pi) \Rightarrow I_{pvt} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I_{pvt}(1) )</td>
<td>( (i, \pi) )</td>
<td>( I_{pub} )</td>
<td>0.0409</td>
<td>( I_{pub} \Rightarrow I_{pvt} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I_{pvt}(1) )</td>
<td>( (i, \pi) )</td>
<td>( I_{pub} ) ( O_g )</td>
<td>1.0004</td>
<td>( O_g \neq I_{pvt} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( I_{pvt}(1) )</td>
<td>( (i, \pi) )</td>
<td>( I_{pub} ) ( O_g ) ( C_{pvt} )</td>
<td>0.0337</td>
<td>( C_{pvt} \Rightarrow I_{pvt} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Model II**        |                       |                                      |                        |                     |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | - - - - - - -         | - - - - - - - -                     | - - - - - - - - - - -  | -                   |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | \( (i, \pi) \)        | - - - - - - - -                     | 1.0611                 | \( (i, \pi) \Rightarrow I_{pvt} \) |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | \( (i, \pi) \)        | \( I_{pubinfra} \) - - - - - - - - - | 0.0573                 | \( I_{pubinfra} \Rightarrow I_{pvt} \) |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | \( (i, \pi) \)        | \( I_{pubinfra} \) \( C_{pvt} \) - - | 1.1164                 | \( C_{pvt} \neq I_{pvt} \) |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | \( (i, \pi) \)        | \( I_{pubinfra} \) \( C_{pvt} \) \( O_g \) | 0.0998                 | \( O_g \neq I_{pvt} \) |

| **Model III**       |                       |                                      |                        |                     |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | - - - - - - -         | - - - - - - - -                     | - - - - - - - - - - -  | -                   |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | \( (i, \pi) \)        | - - - - - - - -                     | 1.0611                 | \( (i, \pi) \Rightarrow I_{pvt} \) |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | \( (i, \pi) \)        | \( I_{pubinfra} \) - - - - - - - - - | 0.0553                 | \( I_{pubinfra} \Rightarrow I_{pvt} \) |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | \( (i, \pi) \)        | \( I_{pubinfra} \) \( C_{pvt} \) - - | 0.0502                 | \( C_{pvt} \Rightarrow I_{pvt} \) |
| \( I_{pvt}(1) \)    | \( (i, \pi) \)        | \( I_{pubinfra} \) \( C_{pvt} \) \( O_g \) | 0.0866                 | \( O_g \neq I_{pvt} \) |

Note: Figures in the parentheses denote the lag length of the controlled variable.

Source (Basic Data): National Account Statistics, New Series, CSO (various issues) and Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI (various issues).

The order in which the variables enter into the equation is as per the specific gravity criteria.\(^{20}\) As per the specific gravity criteria, the explanatory variables are sequenced as follows in Model 1: real interest rate, public investment, output gap, and finally, credit availability to private sector. The results showed that private corporate investment is sensitive to cost and quantity of credit, as well as public investment.

\(^{20}\) Caines, Kend, and Sethi (1981) suggested the following specific gravity criteria methodology for multivariate autoregressive modeling for stationary processes: (I) For a pair of stationary processes \((X, Y)\) construct bivariate AR models of different orders, then compare the multivariate final prediction errors of these models, and choose the model of order \(k\) possessing minimum FPE to be the optimal model for the pair of processes \((X, Y)\); (II) Construct bivariate AR \((k)\) models [both causal models and noncausal (independent) models] for \((X, Y)\) and apply the stage-wise causality detection procedure to determine the endogeneity, exogeneity, or independent relations between \(X\) and \(Y\); (III) If a process, say \(X\), has \(n\) multiple causal variables, \(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n\), we rank these multiple causal variables according to the decreasing order of their specific gravities; (IV) For each caused (endogenous) process, \(X\), we first construct the optimal univariate AR model using FPE criterion, then we include \(X\)'s multiple causal variables, one at a time, according to their causal ranks and use FPE criterion to determine the optimal orders of the model at each step; (V) Pool all the optimal univariate AR models constructed in (IV) and estimate the system.
When the model is respecified using public infrastructure (instead of public investment) the results do not move in tandem with the public investment model. However, the specific gravity criterion of sequencing the variables into the equation suggested that the real rate of interest and public infrastructure investment entered the equation prior to the variables that capture the quantity of credit and output gap. The results suggest that public sector capital formation in infrastructure and real rate of interest proved to be the effective causal factors of private corporate investment, while the output gap and availability of credit were not the causal variables of the private capital formation in the corporate sector.

Similarly, the model is respecified using public noninfrastructure (instead of public investment). Theoretically, considerable ambiguity remains in the direction of the magnitude of public noninfrastructure investment and private capital formation, especially in the context of developing countries. If the government invests in these sectors, which are of a competing nature with private firms, it may lead to crowding out of private investment. At the same time, private firms operate on a level playing field provided by the government in the investible sectors and the government continues investing in noninfrastructure projects, like manufacturing, finance and insurance, business services, etc. A healthy coexistence of private and public sector investment can be, a priori, expected. It is therefore important to econometrically investigate whether public noninfrastructure investments have mutually reinforcing effects on private corporate investment or substitution effects. The analysis showed that public noninfrastructure investment is found to be significant in determining private corporate investment. Moreover, the cost of credit rather than quantity of credit are also found to be significant.

4.5 Error Correction Models
In addition to detection of causality, the sign and magnitude of the causal relationship between private corporate investment and other macrovariables are also of great significance in understanding the mechanism of the crowding-out phenomenon. The evidence of cointegration implies the error correction modeling of private corporate investment.

21 Johansen’s FIML estimates of cointegration based on maximum eigen value tests and trace tests revealed that there are two cointegrating equations when public infrastructure investment is included in the model instead of public investment. The order of cointegrating VAR is detected to be one and the models estimated on the basis of inclusion and exclusion of deterministic trends showed that the rank is two.

22 The pretest of Johansen’s FIML estimates based on maximum eigen value test and trace test for the model respecified using public noninfrastructure investment suggested that there are, at the most, two cointegrating vectors as the rank is detected as two. The order of cointegrating VAR is detected to be one and the models estimated on the basis of inclusion and exclusion of deterministic trends showed that the rank is two.
investment, which combines both the long-run information and short-run dynamics in the equation.

The evidence from the equation, inclusive of error correction term (ecm) and a dummy (D91) for stabilization and structural adjustment reforms since 1991, revealed that public investment affects private capital formation in India (Model 1). There is no evidence of direct crowding out of private corporate investment by public investment; instead it is observed that a one percent increase in public capital formation increased private capital formation in the corporate sector by 1.48 percent. The dummy for structural adjustment has been found to be significant. The estimated coefficient value of the error correction term of 0.322 is found significant, which suggests that the system corrects its previous period’s disequilibrium by 32 percent. The estimated equation reinforced the rejection of the McKinnon hypothesis; as both cost and quantity of credit does matter for the capital formation in the private corporate sector in India. Though partial evidence for financial crowding out is revealed through a negative significant relationship between real rate of interest and private corporate investment, the confirmation of financial crowding out can be detected only after checking whether the real interest rate is induced by fiscal deficit operations of the government. Before going into this analysis, it is imperative to analyze the link between private corporate investment and public investment based on the nonhomogeneity of public capital formation in India.

The evidence from Model (2) revealed that public infrastructure investment crowds in public investment; the magnitude of the effect is also substantial—that a one percent rise in public infrastructure investment crowds in 1.89 percent of private corporate investment. All other variables are found insignificant when public infrastructure is incorporated in the model instead of aggregate public investment. This result interprets that if public infrastructure is provided, investment decisions of the private corporate sector do not depend on quantity and cost of credit.

The evidence from Model (3) revealed that cost, as well as quantity, of credit are significant determinants of private corporate investment. No substitution effects are observed between public noninfrastructure investment and private investment; rather the results show that a one percent increase in public capital formation in noninfrastructural sectors increased the private capital formation in the corporate sector by 1.64 percent. The coefficient of the error correction term is found insignificant in the model, however the value of ecm suggests that the system needs to adjust upward by 15 percent to restore long-run equilibrium.
The above models of public (infrastructure and noninfrastructure) investment showed that there is no evidence of direct crowding out of private corporate investment by public investment. But the confirmation of no financial crowding out can be detected only after checking whether the rise in real interest rate is induced by fiscal deficit operations of the government.

Table 5: Error Correction Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\Delta I_{pvt}(t-1)$</th>
<th>$\Delta I_{pub}(t-1)$</th>
<th>$\Delta I_{pubinfra}(t-1)$</th>
<th>$\Delta I_{pubnoninf}(t-1)$</th>
<th>$\Delta C_{pvt}(t-1)$</th>
<th>$\Delta (O_{g})_{t-1}$</th>
<th>$D_{vt}$</th>
<th>$ecm_{t-1}$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-4.636 (-17.737)*</td>
<td>-0.039 (-1.523)</td>
<td>1.478 (26.323)*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.070 (18.453)**</td>
<td>-1.089 (-20.143)*</td>
<td>-0.088  (8.659)*</td>
<td>0.320    (11.267)**</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[2.86]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-5.716 (-5.645)*</td>
<td>-0.889 (1.966)**</td>
<td>1.889 (9.129)*</td>
<td>2.210 (4.449)**</td>
<td>-1.343 (-4.111)**</td>
<td>0.346 (2.114)</td>
<td>0.324   (0.783)</td>
<td>-0.892   (-2.308)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[2.4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-5.363 (-4.060)**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.641 (9.129)*</td>
<td>-1.343 (-4.111)**</td>
<td>0.346 (2.114)</td>
<td>0.324   (0.783)</td>
<td>-0.892   (-2.308)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 1 %, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

However, it is to be noted that the complicated dynamics of a VAR make direct interpretation of coefficients difficult. The solution is to examine the impulse responses. Impulse response functions are the dynamic simulations based on the estimated coefficients of VAR, which will be dealt in the following section.

4.6 Innovation Accounting: Impulse Response Functions

An impulse response function (IRF) traces the effect of a one standard deviation shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables through the dynamic structure of the VAR. The phenomenon of real crowding out can be detected through the dynamic effect of a unit (one standard deviation) increase of public investment on the (expected) future values of private corporate investment. IRF results of the reaction of private corporate investment to shocks in public investment support the nonoccurrence of crowding out. A unit policy shock to public investment increases private corporate investment by 0.04 in the initial year after the innovation, and it steadily increases and reaches 0.21 percentage points by the end of decadal simulations (Figure 7a).

The differential impacts of public infrastructure and noninfrastructure innovations on the private corporate sector are carried out separately to analyze the nonhomogeneity aspects of public investment. It is revealed that public infrastructure investment has more powerful effects than noninfrastructure. Private corporate investment reacts to a one
standard deviation shock to public infrastructure investment by a rise of 0.14 in the initial year and monotonically increases by 0.178 percentage points in ten years (Figure 7b); while responses of private corporate investment to noninfrastructure investment by the government would be only by 0.005 points in the initial year after the shock and rise meagerly to 0.06 by the end of decade (Figure 7c). These results of IRF reinforce that public investment—in particular, public infrastructure investment—crowds in private corporate investment in the medium and long terms, which has significant policy implications.

The dynamic simulations of private corporate investment to other macrovariables, including cost and quantity of credit and output expectations, revealed that the magnitude of no other variables has been as significant as public investment in determining private corporate investment. Only one exception noted is in Model (3), where the innovations to private corporate investment through the availability of credit (0.13) are more than that of noninfrastructure investment (0.06) at the end of decadal dynamic simulations (Fig 7c). However, the dynamic simulations revealed that these credit-related innovations are found to be insignificant in the latter half of the decade.
Figure 7a: Impulse Response of Model (I)

Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.

- Response of PCI to PCI
- Response of PCI to Real Rate of Interest
- Response of PCI to Public Investment
- Response of PCI to Credit
- Response of PCI to Output Gap

Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 7b: Impulse Response of Model (II)

Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.

- Response of PCI to PCI
- Response of PCI to Real Rate of Interest
- Response of PCI to Public Infrastructure Investment
- Response of PCI to Credit
- Response of PCI to Output Gap
Figure 7c: Impulse Response of Model (III)

Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
4.7 Evidence for Financial Crowding Out

Financial crowding out is advanced in literature through the testing of the causal link between fiscal deficit and rate of interest (Kotlikoff 1984). He further pointed out that much of the concerns with “financial crowding out” revolve around the transaction of selling bonds to finance fiscal deficit. As argument goes, a government’s sale of bonds, regardless of its use of the proceeds, raises the total supply of bonds in the market. The greater supply of bonds (according to this view) means a lower bond price, that is, a higher interest rate, which reduces (crowds out) private investment. The real rate of interest \((R-\pi)_t\) model is specified for India in an open economy macroframework where interest rate is determined by fiscal, monetary, and external factors. The determinants identified are expected rate of inflation \((\pi^e_t)\), growth of money supply \((\Delta M_{3t})\), fiscal deficit \((\text{DEF}_t)\), and exchange rate \((\text{Ser}_t)\). The optimal parameterization of variables through the final prediction criteria suggested that the lag structure of controlled and manipulated variables is one. Also, the specific gravity criteria for ordering the variables in the model allowed the entry of monetary variables prior to the entry of fiscal variables in the interest rate model.

Table 6: Real Rate of Interest Model: Hsiao (1981) Detection of Optimal Lags of the Manipulated Variables and FPE of the Controlled Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controlled Variable</th>
<th>Manipulated Variables</th>
<th>Optimum Lags of Manipulated Variable</th>
<th>Final Prediction Error</th>
<th>Causality Inference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>((R-\pi)_t) (1)</td>
<td>- (\pi^e_t) (\Delta M_{3t}) DEF (1)</td>
<td>- (-) (-) (-)</td>
<td>3.452459</td>
<td>DEF (\neq (R-\pi)_h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((R-\pi)_t) (1)</td>
<td>(\text{Ser}_t) (-) (-) (-)</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>3.208523</td>
<td>(\text{Ser}_t \Rightarrow (R-\pi)_h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((R-\pi)_t) (1)</td>
<td>(\text{Ser}<em>t) (\pi^e_t) (\Delta M</em>{3t})</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>3.235383</td>
<td>(\pi^e_t \Rightarrow (R-\pi)_h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((R-\pi)_t) (1)</td>
<td>(\text{Ser}<em>t) (\pi^e_t) (\Delta M</em>{3t}) DEF</td>
<td>1 (-)</td>
<td>3.287602</td>
<td>(\text{Ser}_t \Rightarrow (R-\pi)_h)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in the parentheses denote the lag length of controlled variable.

The results shown in Table 6 reinforce the absence of financial crowding out in India, as fiscal deficit is found insignificant in determining the real rate of interest. Instead, the results show that the real rate of interest is affected by expected inflation, change in money supply, and the exchange rate in an open economy macromodel.

Quite contrary to the crowding out debate, the analysis shows no significant relationship between fiscal deficit and rate of interest in India. As price expectations are

23 Chakraborty (2006) discusses the theoretical underpinnings of these determinants of rate of interest in detail.
found to be significant in determining rate of interest, the macroeconomic fundamentals need to prevail that can help in controlling the price expectations.

5. CONCLUSION

The results suggest that there is no evidence of direct crowding out of private capital formation by public investment in India. The impact of nonhomogeneity of public capital formation in India on private capital formation is analyzed through public infrastructure and noninfrastructure investment, and found that the former has a complementary relationship with private corporate investment and no evidence of direct (real) crowding out in India. Furthermore, in determining private capital formation, rate of interest is found to be significant.24

Though there is no evidence of direct crowding out of private corporate investment by public investment, the confirmation of no financial crowding out can be detected only after analyzing whether the real interest rate rise is induced by fiscal deficit operations of the government. If the real rate of interest is not induced by fiscal deficit, then no evidence for the occurrence of financial crowding out though private corporate investment is interest rate sensitive. The results showed that rate of interest is not induced by the fiscal operations of the government.

The reasons for no crowding out—direct and financial—may be threefold. One of the plausible reasons for no crowding out in the context of India can be explained from the pattern of savings in the economy, especially that of the households, which has moved in favor of financial assets.25 The conjecture is that the compositional shift in savings in India towards financial assets could moderate the crowding out effects as it increases the loanable funds in the economy and, thereby, imparting less pressure on rate of interest.26 The second reason could be that the increase in financial resources raised through capital markets during the 1980s, in addition to the bank credit to private sector, give an

24 This result of rate of interest being a significant determinant of private investment is in confirmation with certain studies on crowding out in the context of developing countries, including India. For instance, Shafik (1992) in the context of Italy and Parker (1995) in the context of India.

25 The share of financial savings in gross domestic savings has increased from 20.62 percent in 1970–71 to 48.93 percent in 1993–94, and then to 49.78 percent in 1998–99, immediately after a dip to 35.27 percent in 1995–96.

26 It is often argued that one of the principal constraints on investment in the developing countries where prices are administratively controlled is the credit rationing and, therefore, it would be legitimate to hypothesize that private investors in developing countries are restricted by the level of banking (Blejer and Khan 1984).
indication that the private corporate sector, on the aggregate, did not face a shortage of investible resources. The third reason could be the overall liquidity in the system might not have pushed up the interest rate and, in turn, crowded out the private corporate investment.

The results of Impulse Response Function reinforce that no other macrovariables—including cost of credit, quantity of credit, and the output gap—have been as significant as public investment—in particular, public infrastructure investment—in crowding in private corporate investment in the medium and long terms, which has crucial policy implications.

27 The financing of private corporate investment through corporate debentures increased from 696 million U.S. dollars in mid-1980s to 3,500 million U.S. dollars by the mid-1990s, and equity financing of private corporate investment increased from 77 million U.S. dollars in the late 1980s to around 5,000 million U.S. dollars by mid-1990s. Moreover, financing of the private corporate sector through commercial bank borrowing also increased from 9,473 million U.S. dollars in 1984–85 to 16,146 million U.S. dollars by 1994–95 (for details, see Parker 1995).
Appendix 1: Selected Empirical Evidence on Crowding Out

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Period and Country</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Variables Selected</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blejer and Khan (1984)</td>
<td>1971–1979 24 developing countries</td>
<td>Flexible Accelerator Model</td>
<td>Output, real bank credit, real public investment</td>
<td>It is not the level, but the change in public investment that crowds out private investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pradhan, Ratha and Sarma (1990)</td>
<td>1960–1990 India</td>
<td>Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model</td>
<td>Interest rate, modes of financing public investment, money creation, market borrowing, taxation and mark up.</td>
<td>The extent of crowding out varies with the different modes of financing the public investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohanty (1995)</td>
<td>1960–1990 India</td>
<td>RET (Ricardian Equivalence Theorem)</td>
<td>Real disposable income, capital stock, public debt, government expenditure, interest payments.</td>
<td>The direct crowding out impact of government expenditure on private consumption. Government consumption and transfer payments have a positive impact, while public investment and interest payments have negative impact, on private consumption.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1: Selected Empirical Evidence on Crowding Out (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Period and Country</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Variables Selected</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ostrosky (1979)</td>
<td>1950–1975 United States</td>
<td>ISLM</td>
<td>Capacity utilization rate, average profit rate, net change in the government debt, etc.</td>
<td>Investment is affected by the net change in the debt, and hence, crowding out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tun Wai and Wong (1982)</td>
<td>1965–1975 five countries of same development pattern</td>
<td>Flexible Accelerator Model</td>
<td>Public investment, quantity of credit, private sector output</td>
<td>Public investment crowds out private investment. Quantity of credit is also a significant factor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli (2002)</td>
<td>OECD countries</td>
<td>Tobin’s Q Model</td>
<td>Fiscal spending (wage), ratio of primary spending to GDP, private investment</td>
<td>Crowding out: negative effect of fiscal spending—in particular, the wage component—on private investment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SELECTED REFERENCES


